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Abstrak
Perubahan paradigma politik internasional berargumen bahwa 
diskursus keamanan non-tradisional (non-traditional security-NTS) 
adalah ancaman bagi keamanan. Pergeseran ini telah menarik minat 
para sarjana maupun pengambil kebijakan, seiring meningkatnya 
gejolak maupun dampak penting diskursus NTS terhadap keamanan 
pada tingkat domestik, regional, dan global. Diskursus NTS menyangkut 
perubahan iklim, bencana alam, migrasi, dan persoalan lintas batas 
yang melibatkan aktor non-negara dan berdampak pada negara 
dan masyarakat. Tulisan ini mengelaborasi tiga persoalan diskursus 
NTS, yaitu terorisme, peredaran obat terlarang, dan penyelundupan 
senjata ringan yang mengganggu stabilitas Asia Tenggara. Tulisan ini 
berargumentasi bahwa dari segi topografi, wilayah geografis yang 
bersifat terbuka, dan posisinya yang strategis menjadikan wilayah 
ini rentan terhadap ancaman. Konflik pada tingkat domestik yang 
terjadi di Kamboja, Vietnam, Filipina (Mindanao), Indonesia (Aceh) 
dan Thailand (Pattani) telah memberi ruang gerak bagi tindak 
kejahatan lintas batas ini. Tulisan ini terbagi menjadi empat bagian; 
pertama, tulisan ini mengungkap latar belakang konsep kemanan 
non-tradisional. Bagian selanjutnya berfokus pada bagaimana 
terorisme, peredaran obat terlarang dan penyelundupan senjata api 
ringan memengaruhi stabilitas Asia Tenggara secara keseluruhan. 
Berdasarkan data primer seperti dokumen resmi, laporan media terkait 
diskursus ini, tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa wilayah ini akan menjadi 
tempat berlangsungnya aktivitas keamanan non-tradisional jika hal 
ini terus dibiarkan. Harapannya, diskusi tulisan ini akan memerkaya 
diskursus dalam kajian hubungan internasional dan kajian kemanan 
regional, khususnya mengenai diskursus keamanan non-tradisional 
dan bisa menjadi referensi bagi para sarjana, mahasiswa hubungan 
internasional dan para pengambil keputusan.
Kata kunci: keamanan non-tradisional, peredaran obat terlarang, 
penyelundupan senjata ringan, Asia Tenggara, terorisme
1 The original manuscript of this article was presented at the Round Table Discussion at The 
Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, Indonesia on 21st 
November 2012 in conjunction with the UKM-LIPI Archipelago Graduate Network Visit. 
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 have provided space for the discussion of previously 
marginalised issues. These issues are sometimes referred to as ‘new security 
issues’, ‘ambiguous’, ‘non-military’, ‘non-conventional’ issues or ‘grey area 
phenomena’, but regardless of the name chosen, they all affect human, 
state, regional and global security. These issues cross country borders and 
are brought about and committed by non-state actors (Daud and Othman, 
2005). International relation scholars and policy makers have recently become 
interested in the issue of non-traditional issues in individual and multiple 
states, partly because developments in information technology and economic 
openness in some SEA countries that have acted to compound the problem 
(Cusimano, 2011). Therefore, this article will unlock the question of how NTS 
threats have impacted on the stability of the Southeast Asia region. 
Any assessment of the NTS threat in SEA should be considered to be very 
important for three reasons. First, over the last decade the regional security 
environment in SEA has changed dramatically as it is increasingly confronted 
with new security challenges emerging from a host of transnational threats 
(Anthony, 2010). Second, NTS is something that cannot be avoided in a 
rapidly modernising region. Third, NTS threats have an extensive network, 
ensnaring many countries into a realm of globalised crime (Viano, 2009, 2010). 
This article will therefore consider the NTS background in SEA, followed by a 
discussion of three selected NTS cases, namely terrorism, drug trafficking and 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) smuggling, by investigating how each 
of these NTS issues have impacted the security and stability of the Southeast 
Asia region.
Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia
Major world powers have from time-out-of-mind shown an interest in SEA. 
Most of the region has, at some point in history, been the subject of colonial 
power, a fact that has shaped the distinctive political systems, cultures, 
ethnicity, languages and religion of SEA’s eleven countries. The Asian studies 
specialist, Barbara Watson Andaya, sees SEA as divided into two zones, 
namely the ‘mainland’ and ‘island’ regions. The ‘mainland’ zone encompasses 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The ‘island’ zone includes 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, and East Timor 
(Andaya, 2012). Both areas are highly vulnerable to security threats from 
the land or from the sea. Most of the ‘mainland’ countries have experienced 
domestic conflicts that have caused their borders to become fragmented or 
contested spaces, hence very susceptible to drug and weapons smuggling. On 
the other hand, the countries of the ‘island’ zone are disadvantaged by their 
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long littoral boundaries that make it difficult for them to fully safeguard their 
coastal security. 
In the SEA region, the issue of cross-border crime is one of the most 
significant non-traditional issues to the region’s stability.  The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) defined 
transnational crime as encompassing any criminal activity that is conducted 
in more than one state; planned in one state but perpetrated in another; or 
committed in one state where there are spill over effects into neighbouring 
jurisdictions (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010). The United Nations survey 
of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1994) listed 
eighteen categories of transnational crime, including terrorism, and illegal 
trafficking in drugs, arms, piracy, and people. This article will focus on three 
of these categories namely terrorism, drug trafficking and small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) trafficking.
During the period of the Cold War (1946-1989) and the Vietnam War 
(1965-1975), Southeast Asian countries lived in fear of a domino effect, 
whereby security issues resulting from these conflicts would spill over into 
the region. Thus, it became imperative to strengthen and defend Southeast 
Asian territorial integrity to ensure the region’s long-term survival. The end 
of the Cold War, however, changed the dimension of the security threat from 
military and political to non-traditional, including the increase of human 
trafficking, small arms and light weapons as well as illicit drugs smuggling. 
Not all scholars agree. Peter Hough, for example, argues that the military 
threats of the twenty-first century are as serious as they ever have been, if not 
more so than during the Cold War (Hough, 2004: 7). The simple fact is that 
the Southeast Asian nations face both types of threats indeed, Hough argues 
that non-military issues can be securitised and prioritised in line with national 
security.2 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Copenhagen School have worked 
towards broadening and deepening our understanding of NTS threats, 
offering the concept of “new security” which, though it continues to be 
contested, has been recognized by the United Nations (UN). “New security” 
encompasses human security and, according to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and 
Jaap de Wilde, should include military security, political security, economic 
security, social security and environmental security (Buzan et all, 1998). The 
Copenhagen School’s approach has undeniably played a significant role in 
identifying the existence of new security threats and finding solutions.
2 Hough cited Clinton administration’s 1994 National Security Strategy: “Not all security 
risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotic trafficking, 
environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows  also have security 
implications for both present and long term American Policy”. The White House, National 
Security Strategy of Engagement. Washington DC: Government . 1994. 2004 : 1 & 14
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The definition of NTS is quite complex. The S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS) has provided the following comprehensive 
definition. According to RSIS, NTS are challenges to the survival and well-
being of people and states that arise from non-military sources, such as 
climate change, resource scarcity, infectious disease, natural disasters, 
irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and 
transnasional crime (RSIS, 2012). Each issue has its own in-depth definition 
with a description of certain criteria (Ramli et all., 2012).
In addition, NTS also share five common characteristics. They are 
transnational in scope (neither purely domestic, nor purely interstate), come 
at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly due to globalisation and the 
communications revolution, they cannot entirely be prevented but coping 
mechanisms can be devised to lessen their effect. National solutions are 
often inadequate to resolve them, and they require regional and multilateral 
cooperation to address them (Desker, 2011). 
 
Terrorism
Terrorism is a security threat that has been afforded increasing attention 
by scholars since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington D.C. Moreover, terrorism has been securitised by President 
George W. Bush’s adoption of a global “War on Terror”. According to Lutz 
and Lutz, terrorism includes the following elements. The use of violence, or 
the threat of violence, by an organized group to achieve a political objective, 
and this violence is directed against a target audience, who are often innocent 
civilians. Furthermore, while a government can be either the perpetrator of 
violence or the target; it is only considered an act of terrorism if one or both 
actors is not the government; and finally terrorism is a weapon of the weak 
(Lutz and Lutz, 2010). Meanwhile, there is a view that “new terrorism” has 
emerged since September 11 through the exploitation of the information 
technology (IT) revolution to reach a global audience that is much larger than 
the clandestine support based in the pre-Internet age (Tan, 2011). 
After the September 11 attacks, SEA was labelled the “second front” in 
the global war on terror by the United States (Tan, 2011). This designation 
was due in part to the emergence and existence of regional Islamic separatist 
groups associated with the Al-Qaeda network. Al-Qaeda has funded local 
cells in SEA, provided them with military training camps in Afghanistan and 
sought affiliations with other Islamic separatist groups. In some countries, 
these groups seek to establish an Islamic government, lead them to violence at 
the cost of civilian lives. A recent evaluation conducted by the United States’ 
National Counter Terrorism Center (2011) revealed that Thailand and the 
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Philippines were the primary terrorist bases in SEA out of the fifteen countries 
most associated with terrorism in the world.3 
Even though Indonesia is not listed in the National Counter Terrorism 
Center’s 2011 evaluation, a discussion of terrorism in SEA would not be 
completed without mentioning terrorist activities here. The Bali attack in 2002 
appeared to mark a watershed in SEA, with the highest number of causalities 
in a single terrorist attack; the high number of Western causalities; the lethality 
and sophistication of the bombs (including one detonated by a mobile phone), 
and the fact that it was carried out by local suicide bombers (Tan, 2011: 27). 
The incident shows of how an overseas terrorist network could impact human 
security, and the security of a state and a region in its breadth and scope. 
Terrorist activities in Indonesia have largely related to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
a group that has links with the Al-Qaeda network. Table 1 below displays the 
sequence of events associated with the activities of JI.
Table 1. Terrorist Incidents Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
Adapted from: Peter Chalk et al. 2009. Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast 
Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), pp. 98-9 & Andrew 
T. H. Tan. Security Strategies in Asia-Pacific: The United States ‘Second Front’ 
in Southeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 27-28.
3 The 15 countries listed are Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Somalia, Colombia, Thailand, 
Russia, Israel, Nigeria, Greece, Filipina, Yemen, Turkey and Congo. 
Year Incident 
 
2000 The bombing and attempted assassination of the 
Philippine ambassador to Indonesia  
2000 Bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which left 15 
people dead. 
2002 Bali Bombing Incident 
2003 Bombing of the US-owned JW Marriott Hotel, Jakarta 
2004 Almost identical bombing at the Australian High 
Commission, Jakarta 
2002 – 2005 High profile attacks conducted led to 366 causalities and 
more than 688 injuries 
2009 Links to the bombings at the Ritz Carlton and Marriott 
hotels in Jakarta, which targeted a high-powered business 
meeting of Western business executives 
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From the above Table, it can be clearly seen that terrorism in Indonesia 
has affected the country’s stability and demonstrates how easily the region 
has been infiltrated by outside elements. At the same time, the potential 
for terrorist activities has stretched throughout the region: almost all SEA 
countries have had some role in either raising or channelling funds, training 
militant groups, forging documents, manufacturing or smuggling weapons, 
or have been used as sites of opportunity for the carrying out of violent action 
(Freedman, 2010). 
 It is undeniable that JI has received support from a network of terrorists 
in the region, a number that include the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.4 These groups have 
similar goals to JI, demanding an Autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. 
Evidence, including the testimonies of captured JI leaders, has pointed strong 
links between some elements of the MILF and JI, including the continued 
training of JI terrorists in MILF camps and the shared planning of terrorist 
operations (Vaughn et all, 2009).  The MILF and ASG also have a very good 
relationship in both the training and operational front indeed. The ASG was 
originally a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  In 
addition, both groups have been identified as having ties with Al-Qaeda that 
have played an important role in bringing regional terrorist groups together, 
JI included. Together with the MILF Special Operations Group, JI conducted 
bombings in Manila on Rizal Day, December 30 2000, after having met with 
ASG leaders, for example (Gunaratna, 2012). 
Al-Qaeda has had far more influence on ASG than MILF due to the fact that 
most of its original members who had joined since the group was established 
in 1991 were former Afghanistan muhajidiens. Al-Qaeda provided ASG with 
funds through Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, who used to live in Manila, 
and training by Ramzi Yousef who was responsible for the first World Trade 
Center bombing in New York in 1993 (Tan, 2011: 40). ASG executed extreme 
action including extortion, kidnapping for ransom and assassination, in 
addition to the bombings that brought chaos in the Philippines. Table 2 below 
illustrates ASG related terrorist activities.
4 On 15 October 2012, the Philippine government and the MILF has agreed on framework 
agreement for peace. The announcement of the framework agreement came following the 
32nd round of exploratory talks between the negotiating panels from both sides held in the 
Malaysian capital from October 2 to 7, 2012.
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Table 2. Terrorist Incidents Linked to the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG)
Adapted from:  Peter Chalk et al. 2009. Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: 
A Net Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Hlm 51 – 52) & Andrew 
T. H. Tan. Security Strategies in Asia-Pacific: The United States ‘Second Front’ In 
Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 40
Indonesia and the Philippines are not the only areas to have been affected 
by terrorism. Thailand is also one of the fifteen countries highlighted by the 
National Counter Terrorism Center to have experienced terrorist activities 
that might affect the stability of SEA (NCC, 2011). Most of the terrorist attacks 
have occurred in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, 
conducted by several Islamist separatist groups that demand independence 
from Thailand.  The separatist movement was originally an internal conflict. 
The current wave of violence in Thailand originated on January 4 2004, when 
Muslim insurgents and terrorists moved in nine districts in Narathiwat and 
Yala (Gunaratna, 2012: 83). From January 2004 to the end of April 2008, a total 
of 8,064 violent incidents were recorded in southern Thailand: incidents that 
have left 3,002 dead and another 4,871 injured (Chalk et all, 2009: 12).
The relationship between the separatist groups of southern Thailand and 
other terrorist groups such as JI has yet to be determined. However, there are 
signs that indicate the possibility of a connection. For instance, several JI and 
Al-Qaeda operatives have found shelter among co-religionists in Thailand, 
a number that has included the former top JI commander in the region, 
Hambali, until his arrest in Thailand in 2003. Equally, the coordinated nature 
of insurgent attacks as well as the sophistication of the bombings suggests 
global linkages with jihadist elements (Tan, 2011: 75-76). The Pattani Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) – the Pattani independence movement 
– has attracted both foreign-trained Pattani Muslims and foreigners trained 
in Indonesian schools to fight under their banner and Al-Qaeda dispatched 
several Southeast Asian operatives to fight in Thailand (Gunaratna, 2012: 84). 
Year Incident 
 
2000 Kidnapping of 21 hostages including 12 Western tourists 
at the island resort of Sipadan, Sabah, Malaysia 
2004 Firebombing of Philippine Super Ferry 14, a joint operation 
with JI that resulted in 116 deaths 
Febuary 2005 Series of coordinated explosions that took place in Davao 
City, General Santos City, and Manila  
March 2006 The bombing of a bar on Jolo. 
January 2007 Planned simultaneous attacks on sites hosting the ASEAN 
Regional Summit and the East Asian Summit (EAS) 
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The connections between the SEA terrorist groups and the Islamic separatist 
group in Southern Thailand have threatened the country’s sovereignty, the 
human security of its population, and regional security and stability. 
Despite a recent decrease in the terrorist activities of three countries 
discussed in this article, the potency for reescalation still exists. The continued 
call for an autonomous Muslim region or an Islamic state acts as a unifying 
terrorist agenda in this region. Thus, Al-Qaeda might seek an opportunity to 
escalate the jihadist fight by manipulating specific Southeast Asian groups, 
especially those who consider themselves oppressed by their government, 
such as the minority group of Rohingya in Myanmar. The former ASEAN 
Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, argued that the problems suffered by 
those people could facilitate radicalism and the potential destabilisation of 
the whole region to the Malacca Straits, the main gateway to SEA (The Jakarta 
Post, 2012). The warning has also been applied to the situation currently being 
experienced by Cambodian Muslims. In October 2004, the chairman of the 
United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee, Heraldo Muñoz, 
warned that the Cambodian Muslims had become increasingly radicalised as 
a result of discrimination (Chalk et all, 2009: 199). The oppression, disaffection 
and marginalization of such minority groups leaves them open to exploitation 
by al-Qaeda.
Drug Trafficking 
Besides terrorism, SEA also has been exposed to drug smuggling activities. 
As has been emphasized by James Rosenau and Gay & Mussington, the 
threat from cross-border drug trafficking weakens states and contracts their 
sovereignty (Rosenau et all, 1997: 144-161). As the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s World Drug Report 2007 argues, all states 
are facing drug trafficking problems of different magnitudes. The age-old 
problem of drug trafficking jeopardises security at the domestic, regional and 
global level. SEA is no exception where most trafficking is centered on the 
‘Golden Triangle’ of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand (Fortson, 2005).
Illegal drug trafficking syndicates are often associated with other crimes 
including human trafficking, arms and child labour. Indeed, the profitable 
trade in drugs often underpins such other activities and the power of some 
syndicates can undermine the state. In Colombia, South America, for example, 
drug cartels have the power to coerce judges, local police and politicians in 
order to increase the production of the drug industry in that country (Gracia, 
2003). The use of ‘plato o plomo’, or forcible coercion, is common, leading 
to drug cartels influencing Colombian governmental politics and bringing 
unrest to the country. 
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Drug networks are a non-military threat that pose danger to the long-
term prospects of a society in more ways than the attrition of a state by drug 
cartels. According to Alan Dupont, drug abuse by users also facilitates crime 
(Drug, 1998: 1-30). In SEA, most drug users tend to be drawn from the younger 
generation. According to statistics from the National Narcotics Agency 
Malaysia, 65% of addicts in this country were young men between the ages of 
20 to 29 (Kamaruddin, 2006). The ‘Golden Triangle’ that situated in SEA has 
targeted its neighbouring countries namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Cambodia, as transit countries for storing processed heroin before it 
is distributed to other countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Australia and New Zealand (Ismail, 1995). The World Drug Report 2012 stated 
the manufacture of illicit amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) has recently 
been uncovered in countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
which had hitherto only been primarily used as transit countries for ATS. 
Table 3 below shows the categories of drug networks in ASEAN countries.
Table  3. Categories of Drug Networks in ASEAN Countries
Modified From: Yaman Mohamed Ismail Mohamed. 1995. Supply and Trade in 
Narcotics: Checking Sources and Distribution: The Malaysian Experience. 9th Asia 
Pacific Conference Working Paper, Kuala Lumpur 5-8 June & United Nations 
Office On Drugs And Crime. 2012. Jun. World Drug  Report 2012: 80
The above Table shows which ASEAN countries have been enmeshed 
in the drug network either as a producer, a transit country or a recipient. 
Such situation illustrates the severity of the threat to Southeast Asian security. 
Moreover, these activities are predicted to be more acute in the future. 
According to the World Drug Report 2012, Laos and Myanmar account for over 
20% of the world’s total cultivation of opium poppies.  With regards to areas 
of opium poppy cultivation, Myanmar is the second largest after Afghanistan. 
The north-eastern region of Myanmar particularly is at the heart of heroin 
and synthetic production in the ‘Golden Triangle’ (Othman, 2009: 78). Table 4 
below shows statistics relating to drug-related arrests in SEA and reveals the 







Country with illicit 
manufacturing 
 
Myanmar Cambodia Indonesia Cambodia 
Laos Malaysia Brunei  Indonesia 
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Table 4. 
Drug-related (All Types of Drugs) Arrests in Southeast Asia, 2006-2010
Source: Drug Abuse Information Network for Asia and the Pacific - DAINAP. 2011
The above table clearly displays how vulnerable SEA is to drug 
trafficking. In fact, the problem is considered so serious that in June 1998, 
ASEAN officially declared drug trafficking as a threat to its regional security 
and signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug Free ASEAN, committing them to 
eradicate drug trafficking by the year 2020 (a target that was later was shifted 
to 2015) (Othman, 2004: 33-34). However, the target is still far from being 
realised as the statistics above clearly demonstrate inversely. For example, 
the expansion of crystalline methamphetamine manufacture in the region has 
increased by 44% (UNODC, 2011: 8). Overall, the winners are the leaders and 
the losers are the addicts, the state, and society. 
Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking 
The post-Cold War period has also witnessed serious threats related to small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) smuggling, especially in situations where 
the trade has exacerbated internal country conflicts. Indeed, SALW smuggling 
has often been used by non-state actors as a way of influencing government 
decision making through the use or threat of violence (Wall, 2006: 3). The 
magnitude of SALW smugglings expanded dramatically after the end of the 
arms conflict in Cambodia. 
The increase of arms conflicts and insurgency in the Southeast Asian 
region are undeniably linked to the rise of SALW smuggling, threatening 
political stability, social harmony and economic stability. For example, the 




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Thailand 86,197 104,347 149,915 135,976 174,725 
Indonesia 25,012 38,235 40,569 26,721 23,401 
Vietnam 16,686 14,800 24,739 21,086 23,497 
Malaysia 22,811 14,489 12,325 15,736 23,642 
Philippines 11,535 10,710 10,530 9,052 8,259 
Myanmar 3,865 3,074 3,368 4,743 3,465 
Singapore 1,218 2,211 2,537 2,616 2,887 
Brunei D 475 772 591 556 565 
Laos 479 182 418 718 1,007 
Cambodia 608 263 394 615 648 
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SALW has exacerbated conflict between ethnicity and religion. The Ambon 
Conflict that erupted on 19 January 1999 claimed an estimated 9,000 lives and 
more than 400,000 become refugees (Schulze, 2002: 57). 
The smuggling of SALW combines many inter-related factors. First, 
SALW smuggling is often performed by non-state actors whose objective 
has been inspired by religious ideology. Thus, smuggling and regional 
conflict have a direct relationship and, as has been claimed by Fearon in 2002, 
Southeast Asian SALW activities have been particularly prolonged compared 
to other regions, for this very reason (Fearon, 2002). The diffusion of small 
arms in weak or failing states poses an implicit threat to the survival of that 
state because anti-government groups can readily gather the weaponry 
needed to mount a revolution or insurgency (Klare, 2004: 123). The ability 
to execute SALW smuggling has become the main variable of the conflict 
cycle in the Southern Thailand and the Philippines, as well as in Aceh 
and Ambon. Arms smuggling is often connected with other cross-border 
crimes as sources of funding are frequently obtained from overseas from 
contributions by supporters or sympathisers, and are connected with illegal 
logging, prostitution, drug trafficking and extortion (kidnap for ransom). The 
magnitude of the problem requires a strong network of cooperation among 
countries to address the situation.
The second factor is of supply and communications. SALW trafficking has 
focused on Cambodian black markets and the so-called ‘grey area’. Thailand 
is used as one of the main transit areas for any small arm transfers (Wall, 2006: 
116). On the other hand, smuggling can also be part of government’s covert 
activities, including the abuse of weapons confiscated during operations. 
Finally, geographical position plays a large part in SALW trafficking. The 
relative weekness or lack of policing of land and maritime borders between 
neighbouring countries has exacerbated arms smuggling activities. Problems 
also arise from the networks of financial resources, technological expertise, 
training and cooperation of state and non-state actors in this region. When 
SALW trafficking is organized, it has established a strong network and utilises 
sophisticated and up to date global technology, resulted the problem becomes 
even more difficult to overcome.  
SALW smuggling in SEA has resulted in significant human costs, 
especially with its connections with insurgency in the Philippines, Thailand 
and Myanmar. However, none of this violence has undermined a regional 
government (Capie, 2008: 649), but this should not detract from the fact that 
this region could become a safe haven for arms trafficking and black markets. 
As mentioned before, SEA provides a conducive environment for SALW 
which can easily be manipulated by terrorists group operating in the region.
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According to Ryan Clarke (2011: 157-188), supporters of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have occupied strategic locations for arms 
smuggling throughout Asia. One of these is Thailand, the most important 
nation for the LTTE in regard to transhipment, coordination and logistics due 
to its advanced communications infrastructure, proximity to conflict zones 
(current and former) in Myanmar and Cambodia, and its western coastline 
along the Bay of Bengal to Sri Lanka. The failure of the Thai government in 
handling and controlling drug smuggling at the Thailand-Myanmar border, 
has created favourable opportunities for continuous arms smuggling by 
the LTTE with the support of Tamil-Thai community of 10,000 in Thailand. 
This reality, combined with Thailand’s strategic location next to Cambodia’s 
illicit arms markets and geographic proximity to Sri Lanka, made it an area 
that the LTTE could not do without. On the other hand, Cambodia also has 
a substantial arms black market, contributing between 5–10 per cent of the 
LTTE’s stockpile. At the same time, the LTTE was believed to have links with 
insurgent groups in Myanmar’s Karen, Kachin, and Shan states and was 
successful in obtaining weaponry from Myanmar insurgent groups. These 
links will continue to exist as long as these particular groups persist in their 
fight to claim independence from Myanmar.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that SALW smuggling in SEA 
could destabilise the region particularly if the arms dealer network grows. 
Such situation could rapidly become unmanageable, affecting the national, 
regional and human security, as can be seen in Southern Thailand currently 
where uncontrolled SALW smuggling orchestrated by drugs cartels has led to 
the eruption of violence affecting civilians as well as security forces.  
SALW may not be considered as big a threat as conventional weapons. 
However, it has still a significant impact on security. Some of the ASEAN 
countries that have suffered civil wars, have started initiatives to combat 
SALW smuggling. In spite of several ASEAN initiatives to address the 
problems, non-traditional security issues continue to be the problems in the 
region. Apart from that, challenges also derived from the fact that the difficulty 
in safeguarding broad and long boundaries given the geographic nature of 
the region. Even though there has been an integrated effort at cooperation 
through the regional security framework to control SALW trafficking, it is still 
far from achieving its target.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the NTS threat has a significant role in influencing the stability 
of the Southeast Asian region. Among the NTS threats are the transnational 
crimes of terrorism, drug trafficking and SALW smuggling, involving regional 
and international networks. Non-state actor’s activities and networks represent 
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a challenge to many country’s national sovereignty, integrity of independent 
states, threaten the survival of governments, undermine social order by 
increasing the level of violence (Emmers, 2003: 2), and threaten human and 
regional security. The US has labelled SEA as the ‘second front’ in the global 
war on terrorism due to the existence of Islamic separatist groups in this region 
of which are associated with the Al-Qaeda network. The extremist network 
like Al Qaeda take full advantage of local instabilities and tensions between 
minority groups and governments to spread Jihadist ideologies encouraging 
radicalism and violence against civilians. Meanwhile, the threat from drug 
trafficking acts to jeopardise socio-economic and political stability in many 
states. SALW smuggling is also a concern, one which deserves great attention 
even if it does not immediately threaten to bring down a state government. 
The worry lies in the illegal arms dealer’s involvement with drug cartels and 
criminals in the region that can inflame an already unstable Southeast Asian 
region. l 
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